On Morality and Moral Axioms

“If the governing body of a population performs a massacre (and promises more), and its armed forces hide in tunnels below urban areas, no means of fighting them are immoral.” [later]

Years ago I had a friend, a university professor like me. Our friendship ended when we moved to different states, but I suspect it would have ended anyway, on the question of covid vaccine mandates. He was in favor.

He was, and still is, an articulate professional bioethicist — someone who makes a living by trying to tell morally right from morally wrong in matters of health. He told me once that we ought to search for what he called universal morality. I told him that there is no such thing.

Unlike my former friend, I am not a professional philosopher. However, early in my career I acquainted myself with the philosophy of science and reached the conclusion that two opposing schools of statistics — frequentists and Bayesians — are anchored in different views of science. More precisely, they disagree about a foundational axiom behind scientific inquiry.

The idea of an axiom-based conclusion should resonate with anyone who is familiar with the foundation of mathematics. The proof of any theorem can be traced back to at least one axiom, a premise that needs to be accepted as true. It cannot be proven true. And different premises lead to different kinds of mathematics.

Why would it be different in other domains? What is the basis of a code of conduct in any society? Is there any rule about human interaction that cannot be traced to an axiomatic premise?

I would very much like morality to be axiom-free (and to agree with my values), but I think it is not.

And make no mistake, I sometimes feel so strongly about what is morally wrong that I cannot understand how others cannot see it the same way. That’s how I felt, for instance, about vaccine mandates and related threats on livelihood. For a moment I felt that my position reflected unquestionable moral principles: human rights, bodily autonomy, informed consent. How can they be disputed?

Then, I reminded myself that others have different axioms that guide their position on the matter. I have a long list of harsh adjectives to describe that position, but none of them can shake its axiomatic foundation. I distinguished my axioms from theirs by calling mine “moral values” and theirs “immoral ideas”. Not surprisingly, they claimed the opposite.

I have recently looked up again at some writing on moral philosophy. There is nothing there that is not derived from some axiomatic propositions. Take, for example, utilitarianism as a foundation, which argues that we ought to behave in a way that will produce the greatest good for the greatest number. Not only is the statement itself an axiom, but who decides on “the greatest good”, say in politics? The left? The right? Voters for either wish for the best outcome for society, or at least they claim so.

Since moral questions involve actions, and actions have causes and effects, I tried to compare them to causal questions in science using causal diagrams.

On the left I depicted a natural event, M (e.g., the menopause) and listed three possible causes (denoted C) and three possible effects (denoted R for “response”). In science we ask whether each arrow exists and how strong it is.

On the right I depicted a human-made event (M), its possible causes, and the possible responses to M. Moral questions do not ask whether each arrow exists, but whether it should exist. In other words, is each arrow justified? The answers are dictated by P1 and P2, where P denotes premises or principles — axioms that govern human interactions. To simplify, I did not show that predicted consequences of M and R also play a role in deciding on their justification, again, according to moral premises.

If you wish to add content to the abstract, you may consider M to be the attack on Pearl Harbor and R1 to be the dropping of atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Of course, the single arrow between M and R1 summarizes a sequence of causal arrows, with intermediate events and their governing moral premises.

Lastly, history has taught us that moral (i.e., normative) behavior is as stable as the wind. Furthermore, what may be regarded as progress by one view may be regarded as regression by another. Wokeness is a recent example.

What is left, then, in moral philosophy? In the domain of axiomatic values?

Sadly, not much. At most, you can try to do one or more of the following: expose hidden premises and moral inconsistency of the other side, explain consequences of a position, or invoke emotional empathy by words and visuals. Most of the time, it won’t make any difference. How many people switch sides following X/Twitter wars?

I offer below a few quotes on the topic from Professor Yeshayahu Leibowitz. He was a Jewish scholar in the 20th century who held highly controversial views. However, I think his insight here is painfully true (my translation from Hebrew):

“A value cannot be reasoned. It is an irrational entity that does not express reality and is not bound by reality.”

“Moral decisions are not derived from one’s knowledge, but from his wishes, inclinations, and aspirations. Thus, there is no place for a rational critique of values. Once something is considered a value, it is excluded from rational scrutiny.”

“There are no universal values, sir. There is no such thing at all.”

The latter view is sometimes criticized as “moral relativism”, which embeds the criticism in the phrase itself (relative is inferior to absolute). More important, the underlying premise asserts absolute (universal) morality, a fallacy known as “begging the question”.

So, what should we do in matters of morality? How can clashing axioms be resolved? I am assuming clear underlying axioms and not a position that is derived from ignorance about the facts.

Here is the answer of Leibowitz:

“You cannot argue about values. You can only fight over them.”

He was not a pacifist, and I think he meant “fight” in a broad sense: non-violently (political and judicial power) and physically (war), if needed.

World War II was a prime example of a colossal clash between noble values— the axioms of democracy and liberty — and incomprehensible cruelty, the axioms of Nazi Germany.

There are countless other examples, before and after World War II. Most recently, it has been the war on Hamas in Gaza following the October 7 massacre in Israel (the cruelties of which exceed a gruesome massacre that happened 150 years ago, not very far from where I live). You can try to read one description of some of the October 7 atrocities. I could not read the entire thread.

What is a justified response to that massacre? There is no shortage of views that highlight the consequences for civilians. I can only share my moral axiom.

First, wars have always had civilian casualties, on both sides, away from the battle field: the bombing of London and the bombing of Dresden — to name two examples from World War II. And inevitably so, when one side is embedded in an urban population.

If the governing body of a population performs a massacre (and promises more), and its armed forces hide in tunnels below urban areas, no means of fighting them are immoral. That’s my axiom. Civilians of that side can only blame their leadership for casualties among them and for all other consequences of the war. If terrorists care about their civilian population, they can emerge from the tunnels and surrender.

Is there an axiom that quantifies “proportionate civilian casualties” when the enemy is deliberately hiding within a dense urban population? Can human misery during a bloody war not only be quantified but also dichotomized between proportionate (“justified”) and not proportionate (“unjustified”)? I don’t think so. War is always hell. It was hell in London and hell in Dresden back then. There is no humanitarian war and there is no humanitarian response to a massacre. These are oxymorons.

The war on Hamas also exposed old-fashioned antisemitism, a dormant ugly axiom in Western societies, and unbelievable ignorance about historical facts, particularly among the younger generation. Hypocrisy has reached new levels at the UN and the WHO, shameless institutions that were established after World War II to make a better world. The former has been biased and useless; the latter — harmful and corrupted.

Is a third World War still a remote possibility? I am not sure. Does the distinction between friend and foe still run only along country borders? I am not sure either.

I am sure of one thing. These are scary times again on the planet, and it is not due to the climate.